


# Information Sharing and User Privacy in the Third-party Identity Management Landscape

Anna Vapen<sup>1</sup>, Niklas Carlsson<sup>1</sup>, Anirban Mahanti<sup>2</sup>, Nahid Shahmehri<sup>1</sup>


<sup>1</sup>Linköping University, Sweden

<sup>2</sup>NICTA, Australia

# Information Sharing and User Privacy In Third-Party Identity Management



# Background: Third-party Web Authentication




## Web Authentication

- Registration with each website
- Many passwords to remember

## Third-party authentication

- Use an existing **IDP** (identity provider) account to access an **RP** (relying party)
- Log in less often; Stronger authentication
- Share information between websites

# Third-party Authentication Scenario



# Questions

- What type of data is being shared between RPs and IDPs?
- How does information sharing in third-party identity management affect privacy?




# Our Studies

- **Categorization of data in app-right agreements**
  - Manual study on the top 200 most popular websites
- **Targeted login tests on websites using popular IDPs**
- **Pre-study on multi-IDP usage**
  - Leveraging our large scale crawled dataset
  - 3,202 unique RP-IDP relationships



# Protocol and IDP Selection

- The OAuth authorization protocol is increasingly used for authentication
  - Data is transferred in both directions between IDP and RP
  - Rich user data is shared
- The use of the more privacy preserving OpenID protocol is decreasing!



# Protocol and IDP Selection

- IDPs occur in specific combinations
- Many pairs and triples of popular IDPs
- Of RPs with 2-3 IDPs, **75%** of these RPs are selecting all their IDPs from the **top 5** most popular IDPs

Top IDPs:     


 +  37%

 +  19%

 +  12%

# App Rights and Information Flows


- **App-rights: the permission agreements between RP and IDP**
  - Data from IDP to RP
  - Actions from RP to IDP
- **Specified by**
  - Protocol (OAuth)
  - The API of the IDP
  - Selected by RP



# App Rights and Information Flows

 View your email address 

E-mail address used as identifier



# App Rights and Information Flows



Know your basic profile info and list of people in your circles. (Edit list)




Full name, profile picture, Google+ ID, age range, language and friend list


Full name, profile picture, profile URL, public information




View basic information about your account



# App Rights and Information Flows




Post SoundCloud activity on Google+




# Classification of Information

- Basic information (B): Identifiers, public information
- Personal information (P): E.g. interests, age, political views
- Created contents (C): E.g. images, behavior data (likes)
- Friend's data (F): Data belonging to other users
- Authorized actions (A): Update/write/delete data on IDP




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
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
# Risk Types

Data + actions	
Risk type	Class combination
R-	$A \cap B$
R	$A \cap P$
R+	$A \cap P \cap C$
R++	$A \cap P \cap C \cap F$



Actions (A)


Data only	
Risk type	Class combination
$\overline{R-}$	$\neg A \cap B$
$\overline{R}$	$\neg A \cap P$
$\overline{R+}$	$\neg A \cap P \cap C$
$\overline{R++}$	$\neg A \cap P \cap C \cap F$



Non-actions ( $\neg A$ )


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
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
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Actions (A)



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$\overline{R++}$	$\neg A \cap P \cap C \cap F$



Non-actions ( $\neg A$ )

# Risk Types: Results

- Only a few relationships in the most privacy preserving category  $\overline{R^-}$ , OpenID only
- 2+ IDPs: More than half are using actions
  - Actions are dangerous when having several IDPs
  - Potential multi-IDP leakage!



News and file sharing RPs:  
most frequent users of actions

# Head-to-head IDP Comparison

- **Facebook:** Rich data, actions, default settings not privacy preserving
- **Google:** Fine grained personalization, several information “bundles”
- **Twitter:** Much more actions than the other IDPs

Dangerous combination:



rich data + actions

Most popular pair!


Sept. 2014	Relationship type							
IDP (total)	$\bar{R}-$	$\bar{R}$	$\bar{R}+$	$\bar{R}++$	R	R+	R++	Unknown
Facebook (55)	0	24	5	3	13	3	1	6
Twitter (15)	0	0	4	0	0	11	0	0
Google (29)	4	7	0	0	12	0	0	6

# Multi-account Information Risks

- Targeted login tests: all pairs of Google, Twitter and Facebook
- Changing the order of IDPs
  - Connect IDP1 first, then IDP2, and the other way around
- Local account at RP
  - Added before IDP usage
  - Added during first IDP login

# Multi-account Information Risks: Results

- Unwanted combinations of conflicting information
- RPs handle multi-IDP usage badly
- Data import + actions → cross account leakage



# Contributions and Findings

- Captured protocol usage and IDP combinations
  - IDPs occur in specific combinations
  - A non-privacy preserving protocol used
- Profiled information sharing between sites
  - Categorization of transferred data
  - Defined risk types
- Identified privacy issues when using multiple IDPs
  - RPs do not handle multiple IDPs well
  - Imported information may leak to other third-parties

# Information Sharing and User Privacy in the Third-party Identity Management Landscape



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