# Web Authentication using Third-parties in Untrusted Environments


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


# Agenda

- 1. Background
- 2. Research problems
- 3. Analysis
  - Web authentication and untrusted computers
  - The third-party authentication landscape
  - Third-parties and privacy risks
- 4. Contributions



# Background





# Web Authentication

- Method to prove that you are a specific person
- Personal web experience
  - User accounts require authentication



Example: Signing in to Google with username and password



# Password Challenges

Most common web authentication method Simple setup



<u>^</u>

Replay attacks Forgotten by the user Reused on several sites Written down

Alternative methods
Time consuming
Additional equipment





#### Mobile Users and Untrusted Environments

- Mobile users
  - Different devices
  - Different places

- Untrusted environments
  - Infected computer
  - Untrusted WiFi network





# Third-party Web Authentication


- Use an IDP (identity provider) account to access many RPs (relying parties)
- Fewer logins simplify authentication
- Information sharing between websites
  - Privacy leaks!








# Third-party Authentication Scenario







# **Research Problems**






# Research Problems

- 1. Web authentication
  - For mobile users in untrusted environments?
- 2. Third-party authentication
  - Usage over time?
  - How to measure?
- 3. Privacy risks
  - Information flows between parties?








# Web Authentication and Untrusted Computers






### Mobile Phones as Authentication Devices






# Design and Evaluation Method

- Design
  - Select requirements
  - Get design suggestions



- Evaluation
  - Start with an existing design
  - Get a security rating of the design





# Optical Authentication Proof-of-Concept

(3) Response generated (1) Challenge barcode Logged in! shown on screen (2) Take a picture of the challenge






# The Third-party Authentication Landscape





# **Data Collection**

- Popularity-based logarithmic sampling
  - 80,000 points uniformly on a logarithmic range
  - Pareto-like distribution
  - Capturing data from different popularity segments





# Large-scale Crawling

- Selenium-based crawling and relationship identification
- Able to process Web 2.0 sites with interactive elements
- Low number of false positives
- Validation with semi-manual classification and textmatching





# **Collected Data**



25 million analyzed links





3 329 unique relationships 50 IDPs and 1 865 RPs



WHOIS, server location, and audience location



Total site size and number of links and objects




# IDPs vs Content Sharing Services

#### **Content sharing:**


Importing images, scripts etc. from other sites (third-party content providers)

IDPs are selected locally, in contrast to content services.






# Service-based Analysis of RPs







# Third-parties and Privacy Risks





# App Rights and Information Flows





App rights example



# Our Studies on Privacy Risks


- Categorization app-rights data
  - Manual study on the top 200 most popular websites
  - Longitudinal approach: three years
- Targeted login tests
- Privacy risk categorization
  - Data types in app rights
  - Combinations of types





# **Protocol Selection**

- OpenID
  - Authentication protocol
  - Decreasing in popularity
- OAuth
  - RP may use actions on IDP
  - Rich user data is shared
  - Increasingly popular





### **IDP Selection**

- Top 200 April 2012: 69 RPs and 180 relationships
- Same sites, April 2015: +15 RPs and +33 relationships
- 75% of these RPs are selecting all their IDPs from the top
   5 most popular IDPs






# Risk Types


Facebook, Twitter and Google:

- Only a few relationships in the most privacy preserving category
- 2+ IDPs: More than half are using actions
  - Dangerous when having several IDPs
  - Potential multi-hop leakage





# Multi-account Information Risks




Connecting several IDPs to an RP

- Cross account leakage
- Unwanted combinations of conflicting information
- RPs handle multi-IDP usage badly




# Structures in the RP-IDP Landscape




#### **High-degree IDP case**

- IDP having many RPs
- Top IDPs



#### **High-degree RP case**

- RP having many IDPs
- Specialized IDPs




#### **Hybrid** case

Hybrids are both RP and IDP



# RP-to-RP Leakage Example



RP-to-RP leaks	February 2014		April 2015	
IDP	All	Severe	All	Severe
Facebook	645	150	473	66
Twitter	110	110	110	110
Google	91	0	91	0

Dataset with 44 RPs using Facebook, 14 using Twitter and 12 using Google

- Potential RP-to-RP leaks
  - Data posted to IDP from RP1
  - Data read from IDP to RP2




# Contributions



# Contributions

- Design and evaluation method
- Large-scale RP-IDP measurements
  - Novel measurement method
  - Categorization of RP-IDP relationships
- Privacy risks and information sharing
  - Protocol analysis
  - Structural properties







# Web Authentication using Third-parties in Untrusted Environments Anna Vapen

#### Papers included in this thesis:

- Security Levels for Web Authentication using Mobile Phones, PrimeLife'11
- 2-clickAuth Optical Challenge-Response Authentication using Mobile Handsets, IJMCMC'11
- Third-party Identity Management Usage on the Web, PAM'14
- A Look at the Third-Party Identity Management Landscape, IC'16
- Information Sharing and User Privacy in the Third-party Identity
   Management Landscape, SEC'15
- Longitudinal Analysis of the Third-party Authentication Landscape, UEOP'16



