Security

TDTS04 – Computer Networks and Distributed Systems

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Slides based on https://gaia.cs.umass.edu/kurose_ross/ppt-8e/Chapter_8_v8.1.pptx

Security: overview

Chapter goals:

- understand principles of network security:
  - cryptography and its *many* uses beyond "confidentiality"
  - authentication
  - message integrity
- security in practice:
  - firewalls and intrusion detection systems
  - security in application, transport, network, link layers

Chapter 8 outline

- What is network security?
- Principles of cryptography
- Message integrity, authentication
- Securing TCP connections: TLS
- Security in wireless and mobile networks
- Operational security: firewalls and IDS

What is network security?

confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents

- sender encrypts message
- receiver decrypts message

message **i**ntegrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

access and **a**vailability: services must be accessible and available to users

authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

The "holy trinity" in security: C-I-A (**C**onfidentiality, **I**ntegrity, **A**vailability)

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

- well-known in network security world
- Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely”
- Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages



Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

Who might Bob and Alice be?

- … well, *real-life* Bobs and Alices!
- Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
- on-line banking client/server
- DNS servers
- BGP routers exchanging routing table updates
- other examples?

There are bad guys (and girls) out there!

Q: What can a "bad guy" do?

A: A lot! (recall section 1.6)

- eavesdrop: intercept messages
- actively insert messages into connection
- impersonation: can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet)
- hijacking: "take over" ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place
- denial of service: prevent service from being used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)

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The language of cryptography



m: plaintext message

$K_A(m)$: ciphertext, encrypted with key K_A

$m = K_B(K_A(m))$

“Breaking” crypto

Course book has some discussion about breaking crypto

- Not so relevant in practice
- Modern crypto algorithms are effectively unbreakable (until proven otherwise!)
- **Assuming that (!)**
  - You don’t use too short/simple keys that can be guessed (brute-forced) in reasonable time
  - You use standardized well-know algorithms and crypto schemes (ways of using the algorithms)
  - You **don’t** try to invent your own crypto algorithms or crypto schemes

Symmetric key cryptography



symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K

Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES: Data Encryption Standard (**OBS: deprecated today**)

- US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
- 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
- block cipher with cipher block chaining
- how secure is DES?
  - DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) **in less than a day**
  - no known good analytic attack
- making DES more secure:
  - 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES (Nov 2001)
- processes data in 128 bit blocks
- 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

Public Key Cryptography

symmetric key crypto:

- requires sender, receiver know shared secret key
- Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never “met”)?

public key crypto

- *radically* different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- sender, receiver do *not* share secret key
- *public* encryption key known to *all*
- *private* decryption key known only to receiver

Public Key Cryptography



Wow - public key cryptography revolutionized 2000-year-old (previously only symmetric key) cryptography!

- similar ideas emerged at roughly same time, independently in US and UK (classified)

Public key encryption algorithms

requirements:

1. need $K_B^+(\cdot)$ and $K_B^-(\cdot)$ such that

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

2. given public key K_B^+, it should be impossible to compute private key K_B^-

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

- Based on the fact that it's hard to factor very large numbers
- We don't go into mathematical details here…
- Alternative pub-key algorithm: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

RSA in practice: session keys

- RSA is computationally intensive
- Symmetric ciphers orders of magnitude faster than RSA
- use public key crypto to establish secure connection, then establish second key – symmetric session key – for encrypting data

session key, K_S

- Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric session key K_S
- once both have K_S, they use symmetric key cryptography

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Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

failure scenario??

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

in a network, Bob can not “see” Alice, so Trudy simply declares herself to be Alice

Authentication: another try

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet containing her source IP address



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

Trudy can create a packet “spoofing” Alice’s address

Authentication: a third try

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her secret password to "prove" it.



failure scenario??

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

playback attack:
Trudy records Alice's packet and later plays it back to Bob

Authentication: a modified third try

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her encrypted secret password to "prove" it.



failure scenario??

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

playback attack still works: Trudy records Alice's packet and later plays it back to Bob

Authentication: a fourth try

Goal: avoid playback attack

nonce: number (R) used only once-in-a-lifetime

protocol ap4.0: to prove Alice "live", Bob sends Alice nonce, R

- Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key



Failures, drawbacks?

Authentication: ap5.0

ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key - can we authenticate using public key techniques?

ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography



Bob computes

$K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$

and knows only Alice could have the private key, that encrypted R such that

$K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$

Authentication: ap5.0 – there's still a flaw!

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



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Digital signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures:

- sender (Bob) digitally signs document: he is document owner/creator.
- *verifiable, nonforgeable:* recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document
- simple digital signature for message m:
  - Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key K_B, creating "signed" message, $K_B^-(m)$



Digital signatures

- suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: m, $K_B^-(m)$
- Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key K_B^+ to $K_B^-(m)$ then checks $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$.
- If $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$, whoever signed m must have used Bob's private key

Alice thus verifies that:

- Bob signed m
- no one else signed m
- Bob signed m and not m'

non-repudiation:

- ✓ Alice can take m, and signature $K_B^-(m)$ to court and prove that Bob signed m

Message digests

computationally expensive to public-key-encrypt long messages

goal: fixed-length, easy- to-compute digital “fingerprint”

- apply hash function H to *m*, get fixed size message digest, *H(m)*



Hash function properties:

- many-to-1
- produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint)
- given message digest *x*, computationally infeasible to find *m* such that *x* = *H(m)*

Digital signature = signed message digest

Bob sends digitally signed message:



Alice verifies signature, integrity of digitally signed message:



Properties of cryptographic hash functions

Important properties of **cryptographic** hash functions

- **Collision resistance**
  not possible (other than by brute force) to find m, m' such that H(m) = H(m')
- **Preimage resistance**
  given D, not possible to find m such that H(m) = D
- **Second preimage resistance**
  given m, not possible to find m' such that H(m) = H(m')

Many common hash functions **do not** fulfil these properties!

- Internet checksum, CRC, etc. only suitable for checking for random bit errors – not deliberate manipulation!

Message Authentication Codes

Hash algorithms cannot provide integrity or authentication by themselves!

- Attacker can just modify message and recompute hash



Message Authentication Codes

Hash algorithms cannot provide integrity or authentication by themselves!

- Attacker can just modify message and recompute hash
- **Message authentication codes** (MACs) solve this problem
- Commonly implemented using cryptographic hash functions (HMACs)
  - Hashes **with a symmetric key**, conceptually: H(m + key)
  - Only holder of key can compute same hash
- Alternative to signing with public key crypto
  - Pro: much faster (recall: RSA is slow)
  - Con: requires both parties to know symmetric key
- HMACs frequently used in many security related protocols

Hash function algorithms

- (MD5)
  - computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process.
  - **Now deprecated** (collision attack found in 2013)
- (SHA-1)
  - US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
  - 160-bit message digest
  - **Now deprecated** (chosen prefix attacks in 2020)
- **SHA-2**
  - US standard [FIPS PUB 180-4]
  - 224/256/384/512-bit message digest
  - 256-bit most common “SHA-256”

Authentication: ap5.0 – let's fix it!!

Recall the problem: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



Need for certified public keys

- motivation: Trudy plays pizza prank on Bob
  - Trudy creates e-mail order:
    Dear Pizza Store, Please deliver to me four pepperoni pizzas. Thank you, Bob
  - Trudy signs order with her private key
  - Trudy sends order to Pizza Store
  - Trudy sends to Pizza Store her public key, but says it's Bob's public key
  - Pizza Store verifies signature; then delivers four pepperoni pizzas to Bob
  - Bob doesn't even like pepperoni

Public key Certification Authorities (CA)

- certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E
- entity (person, website, router) registers its public key with CE provides "proof of identity" to CA
  - CA creates certificate binding identity E to E's public key
  - certificate containing E's public key digitally signed by CA: CA says "this is E's public key"



Public key Certification Authorities (CA)

- when Alice wants Bob's public key:
  - gets Bob's certificate (Bob or elsewhere)
  - apply CA's public key to Bob's certificate, get Bob's public key



Note: Still need to know CA's public key!

- Stored in a self-signed **root CA certificate**
- Your OS comes pre-installed with a set of trusted root CAs

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Transport-layer security (TLS)

- widely deployed security protocol above the transport layer
  - supported by almost all browsers, web servers: https (port 443)
- provides:
  - confidentiality: via *symmetric encryption*
  - integrity: via *cryptographic hashing*
  - authentication: via *public key cryptography*

all techniques we have studied!

- history:
  - early research, implementation: secure network programming, secure sockets
  - secure socket layer (SSL) deprecated [2015]
  - TLS 1.3: RFC 8846 [2018]

Transport-layer security: what's needed?

- let's *build* a toy TLS protocol, *t-tls,* to see what's needed!
- we've seen the "pieces" already:
  - handshake: Alice, Bob use their certificates, private keys to authenticate each other, exchange or create shared secret
  - key derivation: Alice, Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys
  - data transfer: stream data transfer: data as a series of records
    - not just one-time transactions
  - connection closure: special messages to securely close connection

t-tls: initial handshake



t-tls handshake phase:

- Bob establishes TCP connection with Alice
- Bob verifies that Alice is really Alice
  - Alice sends cert, Bob verifies against root cert installed on his machine
- Bob sends Alice a master secret key (MS), used to generate all other keys for TLS session (encrypted with Alice's public key, from her cert).
- potential issues:
  - 3 RTT before client can start receiving data (including TCP handshake)

Integrity checks in t-tls

TCP already checks for bit errors with checksum

- Why do we need separate integrity check?

Even if data is encrypted, attacker could still modify ciphertext and recompute TCP checksum in spoofed packet

- Decrypted data will likely just be a garbled mess – but receiver has no way of knowing that data is corrupt!

Add hash to data. Extra security by using a MAC.

t-tls: cryptographic keys

- considered bad to use same key for more than one cryptographic function
  - different keys for message authentication code (MAC) and encryption
- four keys:
  - K_c : encryption key for data sent from client to server
  - M_c : MAC key for data sent from client to server
  - K_s : encryption key for data sent from server to client
  - M_s : MAC key for data sent from server to client
- keys derived from key derivation function (KDF)
  - takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random data to create new keys

t-tls: encrypting data

- recall: TCP provides data *byte stream* abstraction
- Q: can we encrypt data in-stream as written into TCP socket?
  - *A:* where would MAC go? If at end, no message integrity until all data received and connection closed!
  - *solution:* break stream in series of "records"
    - each client-to-server record carries a MAC, created using M_c
    - receiver can act on each record as it arrives
- t-tls record encrypted using symmetric key, K_c, passed to TCP:

t-tls: encrypting data (more)

- possible attacks on data stream?
  - *re-ordering:* man-in middle intercepts TCP segments and reorders (manipulating sequence #s in unencrypted TCP header)
  - *replay*
- solutions:
  - use TLS sequence numbers (data, TLS-seq-# incorporated into MAC)
  - use nonce

t-tls: connection close

- truncation attack:
  - attacker forges TCP connection close segment
  - one or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is
- solution: record types, with one type for closure
  - type 0 for data; type 1 for close
- MAC now computed using data, type, sequence #

Transport-layer security (TLS)

- TLS provides an API that *any* application can use
- an HTTP view of TLS:



TLS: 1.3 cipher suite

- "cipher suite": algorithms that can be used for key generation, encryption, MAC, digital signature
- TLS: 1.3 (2018): more limited cipher suite choice than TLS 1.2 (2008)
  - only 5 choices, rather than 37 choices
  - *requires* Diffie-Hellman (DH) for key exchange, rather than DH or RSA
  - combined encryption and authentication algorithm ("authenticated encryption") for data rather than serial encryption, authentication
    - 4 based on AES
  - HMAC uses SHA (256 or 284) cryptographic hash function

TLS 1.3 handshake: 1 RTT



1. client TLS hello msg:
   - indicates TLS version and cipher suites it supports

2. server TLS hello msg chooses
   - key agreement protocol, parameters
   - cipher suite
   - server-signed certificate

3. client:
   - checks server certificate
   - generates key
   - can now make application request (e.g.., HTTPS GET)

TLS 1.3 handshake: 0 RTT



- initial hello message contains encrypted application data!
  - "resuming" earlier connection between client and server
  - application data encrypted using "resumption master secret" from earlier connection
- vulnerable to replay attacks!
  - maybe OK for HTTP GET or client requests not modifying server state

Chapter 8 outline

- What is network security?
- Principles of cryptography
- Authentication, message integrity
- Securing e-mail
- Securing TCP connections: TLS
- Network layer security: IPsec

- **Security in wireless and mobile networks**
  - 802.11 (WiFi)
  - 4G/5G
- Operational security: firewalls and IDS

802.11: authentication, encryption



Arriving mobile must:

- associate with access point: (establish) communication over wireless link
- authenticate to network

802.11: authentication, encryption



1 discovery of security capabilities:

- AP advertises its presence, forms of authentication and encryption provided
- device requests specific forms authentication, encryption desired

although device, AP already exchanging messages, device not yet authenticated, does not have encryption keys

802.11: authentication, encryption



(2) mutual authentication and shared symmetric key derivation:

- AS, mobile already have shared common secret (e.g., password)
- AS, mobile use shared secret, nonces (prevent replay attacks), cryptographic hashing (ensure message integrity) to authenticating each other
- AS, mobile derive symmetric session key

802.11: WPA3 handshake



ⓐ AS generates $Nonce_{AS}$, sends to mobile

ⓑ mobile receives $Nonce_{AS}$

- generates $Nonce_M$
- generates symmetric shared session key K_{M-AP} using $Nonce_{AS}$, $Nonce_M$, and initial shared secret
- sends $Nonce_M$, and HMAC-signed value using $Nonce_{AS}$ and initial shared secret

ⓒ AS derives symmetric shared session key K_{M-AP}

802.11: authentication, encryption



3 shared symmetric session key distribution (e.g., for AES encryption)

- same key derived at mobile, AS
- AS informs AP of the shared symmetric session

802.11: authentication, encryption



④ encrypted communication between mobile and remote host via AP

- same key derived at mobile, AS
- AS informs AP of the shared symmetric session

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Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE



- arriving mobile must:
  - associate with BS: (establish) communication over 4G wireless link
  - authenticate itself to network, and authenticate network
- notable differences from WiFi
  - mobile's SIMcard provides global identity, contains shared keys
  - services in visited network depend on (paid) service subscription in home network

Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE

- mobile, BS use derived session key K_{BS-M} to encrypt communications over 4G link
- MME in visited network + HHS in home network, together play role of WiFi AS
  - ultimate authenticator is HSS
  - trust and business relationship between visited and home networks

Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE



ⓐ authentication request to home network HSS

- mobile sends attach message (containing its IMSI, visited network info) relayed from BS to visited MME to home HHS
- IMSI identifies mobile's home network

Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE



ⓑ HSS use shared-in-advance secret key, K_{HSS-M}, to derive authentication token, *auth_token*, and expected authentication response token, $xres_{HSS}$

- *auth_token* contains info encrypted by HSS using K_{HSS-M} , allowing mobile to know that whoever computed *auth_token* knows shared-in-advance secret
- mobile has authenticated network
- visited HSS keeps $xres_{HSS}$ for later use

Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE



ⓒ authentication response from mobile:

- mobile computes res_M using its secret key to make same cryptographic calculation that HSS made to compute $xres_{HSS}$ and sends res_M to MME

Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE



ⓓ mobile is authenticated by network:

- MMS compares mobile-computed value of res_M with the HSS-computed value of $xres_{HSS}$. If they match, mobile is authenticated ! (why?)
- MMS informs BS that mobile is authenticated, generates keys for BS

Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE



e mobile, BS determine keys for encrypting data, control frames over 4G wireless channel

- AES can be used

Authentication, encryption: from 4G to 5G

- 4G: MME in visited network makes authentication decision
- 5G: home network provides authentication decision
  - visited MME plays “middleman” role but can still reject

- 4G: uses shared-in-advance keys
- 5G: keys not shared in advance for IoT

- 4G: device IMSI transmitted in cleartext to BS
- 5G: public key crypto used to encrypt IMSI

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Firewalls

firewall

isolates organization's internal network from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others



Firewalls: why

prevent denial of service attacks:

- SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for “real” connections

prevent illegal modification/access of internal data

- e.g., attacker replaces victims homepage with something else

allow only authorized access to inside network

- set of authenticated users/hosts

three types of firewalls:

- stateless packet filters
- stateful packet filters
- application gateways

Stateless packet filtering



- internal network connected to Internet via router firewall
- filters packet-by-packet, decision to forward/drop packet based on:
  - source IP address, destination IP address
  - TCP/UDP source, destination port numbers
  - ICMP message type
  - TCP SYN, ACK bits

Stateless packet filtering: example



- example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23
  - result: all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked
- example 2: block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0
  - result: prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside

Stateless packet filtering: more examples

Policy	Firewall Setting
no outside Web access	drop all outgoing packets to any IP address, port 80
no incoming TCP connections, except those for institution's public Web server only.	drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any IP except 130.207.244.203, port 80
prevent Web-radios from eating up the available bandwidth.	drop all incoming UDP packets - except DNS and router broadcasts.
prevent your network from being used for a smurf DoS attack.	drop all ICMP packets going to a "broadcast" address (e.g. 130.207.255.255)
prevent your network from being tracerouted	drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic

Stateful packet filtering

- *stateless packet filter:* heavy handed tool
  - admits packets that "make no sense," e.g., dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection established:

action	source address	dest address	protocol	source port	dest port	flag bit
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK

- *stateful packet filter:* track status of every TCP connection
  - track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): determine whether incoming, outgoing packets "makes sense"
  - timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets

Application gateways

- filter packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
- *example:* allow select internal users to telnet outside



1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.
2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host
   - gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway

Limitations of firewalls, gateways

- IP spoofing: router can't know if data "really" comes from claimed source
- if multiple apps need special treatment, each has own app. gateway
- client software must know how to contact gateway
  - e.g., must set IP address of proxy in Web browser

- filters often use all or nothing policy for UDP
- *tradeoff:* degree of communication with outside world, level of security
- many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks

Intrusion detection systems

- packet filtering:
  - operates on TCP/IP headers only
  - no correlation check among sessions
- IDS: intrusion detection system
  - deep packet inspection: look at packet contents (e.g., check character strings in packet against database of known virus, attack strings)
  - examine correlation among multiple packets
    - port scanning
    - network mapping
    - DoS attack

Intrusion detection systems

multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations



Network Security (summary)

basic techniques……

- cryptography (symmetric and public key)
- message integrity
- end-point authentication

…. used in many different security scenarios

- secure transport (TLS)
- 802.11
- 4G/5G

operational security: firewalls and IDS