

# Information Security Identification and authentication

## Advanced User Authentication I

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Amund Hunstad

Guest Lecturer, [amund@foi.se](mailto:amund@foi.se)

LiU

expanding reality

# Agenda for this part of the course

Background

Statistics in user authentication

Biometric systems

Tokens

# Agenda for lecture I within this part of the course

Background

Statistics in user authentication

Biometric systems

Tokens

Authentication

eID

ePassports

Biometrics in general

Statistics

Fumy, W. and Paeschke, M. Handbook of eID Security

A. Jain, A. Ross and K. Nandakumar, Chapters 1 in "Introduction to Biometrics"

# User authentication/identification

Can in an IT system be achieved via

What I know – passwords, PIN

What I have – ID-cards, smart-card, token

What I am/do – biometrics

## Identification

## Authentication



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# Human ID identification/authentication: Used when, where and why?

Forensics: Does a suspect match the features of a criminal

Banking/Financial services: Money only to its owners

Computer & IT Security: Access only to those authorised

Healthcare: Correct patient history (and billing)

Immigration: Blocking unwanted residents in spe

Law and Order: Punishing the correct person

Gatekeeper/Door Access Control: Access only if authorised

Telecommunication: Billing, trust base and privacy

Time and Attendance Logging: For future audit

Welfare: Only to valid beneficiaries

Consumer Products: Against unauthorised use, liability etc.

# Biometric examples

SAS – Scandinavian Airline Systems: Fingerprints used to tie the person who checked in luggage to the person who passes the passenger gate.

OMX Group: To enter to most secret part of the company you have to authenticate yourself in an iris scan.

A school in Uddevalla, Sweden: To enter the dining area you needed to identify yourself with your fingerprint.

Disney World, SeaWorld and other amusement parks and entertainment centers: Fingerprints to tie tickets to their users

India: Welfare services tied to fingerprints

# Authentication requirements

Can be presented only by the correct person

- Only the correct person knows the value

- Only the correct person can physically present the value

Has enough diversity to be unique enough

- Truly unique, can be used for identification

- Overlap very unlikely, can be used for authentication



# eID: Electronic identity

Then: Manual ID control, e.g. in a bank or post office

Now: Transactions & communication online

Future: Internet of Things (IoT)



# IoT ... Internet of Toilets?

## A System for Identifying Toilet User by Characteristics of Paper Roll Rotation

Masaya Kurahashi  
Kobe University, Japan  
kura-hash@stu.kobe-u.ac.jp

Tsutomu Terada  
Kobe University, Japan  
tsutomu@eedept.kobe-u.ac.jp

Kazuya Murao  
Ritsumeikan University, Japan  
murao@cs.ritsumei.ac.jp

Masahiko Tsukamoto  
Kobe University, Japan  
tuka@kobe-u.ac.jp

### ABSTRACT

Along with the progress of miniaturization and energy saving technologies of sensors, biological information in our daily life can be monitored by installing the sensors to a lavatory bowl. Lavatory is usually shared among several people, therefore biological information need to be identified. Using camera, microphone, or scales is not appropriate considering privacy in a lavatory. In this paper, we focus on the difference in the way of pulling a toilet paper roll and propose a system that identifies individuals based on features of rotation in the way of pulling a toilet paper roll. The evaluation identifies individuals based on features of rotation in the way of pulling a toilet paper roll.

to privacy concerns. Buttons or a touch panel to input user ID can be installed in a lavatory. However, it is not appropriate to force the users to input ID which is originally unnecessary action to the users every time they use a lavatory. Therefore, user identification through sensing actions we ordinary do, such as opening a toilet door, sitting on a toilet seat, pulling a toilet paper roll and flushing the toilet, is desirable. Personal traits are more likely to appear in pulling a toilet paper roll because most of us have never watched someone pulling a toilet paper roll or never learned how to pull it.

In this paper, we propose a system that recognizes individuals based on how to pull a toilet paper roll. Our system identifies individuals based on how to pull a toilet paper roll.

# eID: Challenges

- New possibilities for criminal activity
  - Public administration, businesses and citizens act within digital networks
- Phishing
- Social engineering
- ID theft, Identity fraud
- Cyber attacks on personal data
- Spoofed websites
- Compromised log-in accounts

# eID-threats and risks: Do I have to care?

- 2010: ID fraud survey
  - 5% US population victims of ID theft
  - 13% of ID fraud crimes by someone the victim knew
  - Financial losses
  - Re-establishing attacked ID: On average 21 hours
- Verification & authentication process less transparent than offline

# eID: Necessary qualities

- Trust
- Data control
- Usability
- Interoperability
  - Mutual trust for administrations
  - Provide various security levels for eID services
  - Context sensitive approach
  - Provide private sector participation

# eID: Necessary qualities

- Role of personal devices
  - 2011
    - 6,8 billion inhabitants
    - **4,6 billion mobile phones**
    - 1,7 billion Internet users
    - 1.6 billion TV:s
    - 3,9 billion radios
- Privacy protection
  - Pseudonymity & anonymity
- Documentless proof of ID?

# eID: Challenges

- Need to prove ID on the Internet
- Verify identity of virtual counterpart
  - In eCommerce
  - In eGovernment
- Solution:
  - eID
  - eID management
  - Provide critical infrastructures for electronic businesses and government & administration

# eID: Security measures

Security of the eID document

Cryptography

Security protocols

**Biometric techniques**

Security of eID chips





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**“FIDELITY: Fast and trustworthy Intity  
Delivery and check with ePassports  
leveraging Traveler privacy”**

# The ePassport

## High efforts to make travel documents more secure, especially since September, 11



## Launch of the ePassport

specified by **ICAO**


most difficult to forge travel document ever

## embedded chip

## biometry for ID checks



# Success in ePassport deployment



345 million ePassports issued by 93 states  
(ICAO estimates in July 2011)

■ Biometric passports available to the general public  
■ Announced future availability of biometric passports



# But ...

After several years of use, some weaknesses became apparent in

ePassport **issuing** process, security of **breeder documents**

**Speed** of ID checks at borders





Connections with **remote data bases** (SIS, VIS, Eurodac, PNR, ...)

**Certificates** management

**Personal data protection**

Means to check quality of **biometrics** data

Revocation



# Frontex study

## **Reliability of the e-passport issuance**

*Information exchange*

*Training (and possibly tool provisioning)*

*Compile good practices*

*Common guidelines*

*Inter-country review*

**Lookalike fraud with e-passports is a substantial risk for EU/Schengen border control.**

*Improve the quality of the digital facial image*

*Usage of fingerprints in border control*

# Frontex study

**The usage of e-passport functionality is limited and not uniform.**

*Training of border guards*

*Deployment of e-passport inspection*

*Harmonisation of the inspection procedure*

*Collect real-life performance data from Automated Border Control system pilots*

**Experienced operational difficulties in deploying e-passport inspection infrastructures.**

*Public key infrastructures*

*Document signing certificates in the e-passports*

*“Defect lists” in inspection systems*

# Frontex study

**Cloning of e-passport chips is a serious concern.**

*Authenticating the chip in all EU e-passports*

**Security of national identity cards is not standardised, weak link in border control. (C6)**

**Phasing out the usage of the SHA-1 secure hash function as part of signing e-passport information.**




# Frontex study

The technical security measures: Increasingly hard to circumvent & standardised to a high degree

Focus of fraudsters is shifting towards the inspection and issuance procedures.


# Country Signing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Used to verify the integrity of the data in the passports chip (has the data not been changed) and their authenticity (does the data originate from an official issuing authority)



# Country Verifying Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Authenticates the inspection terminals of  
automated border control



# Biometrics, definition

"The automated use of physiological or behavioural characteristics to determine or verify identity"

Bio from Greek life

Metric from Greek measurement

In this case we measure

Physical properties of the user's body


Behaviour properties of the user

# Biometrics

One of the remarkable abilities of humans and most animals is to identify other individuals

Humans do it primarily through face and voice.

Body proportions, movements etc. are also important







# Using the anthropometry for biometrics is not a new idea...

Alphonse Bertillon 1853-1914

Identification through a system that involved around eleven measurements of the human anatomy

Paris, 1882





# “Portrait parlé”

body measurements

iris coloration

photography

individual

particularities

(including  
fingerprints)


About an identification process that enables finding the name of a repeat offender based on his description only, and that can be used in the context of a classification of photographs in the police headquarters, in the national security office, at the ministry of justice, etc.

Alphonse Bertillon, 1881.

Height, m	67	Head, length	19.1	Forearm	27.6	Circle, 11	Age	28 years
Stoop	2	" width	15.2	" Mid F	11.2	Periph. 2nd. 81. 111		
Outs. A, m	75	Ear, length	5.6	" Lit. F	4.8	Color of eye	lim. y.	Born in
Trunk	92	Ear, width		" Forearm	45.8	Peculi.		Illinois.

Remarks incident to Measurements, { Two phalanges of left 1. finger amputated.

25. 1. 8. 9.




DESCRIPTIVE.			
Incl. receding	Profile	Ridge, concave	upper rim
Hght. 111	Note	Base, steep, Root, 111	indented
Width, 111		Length, Projection, Breadth	lower bris
Pecul.		111, front narrow	Build, medium
		Pecul. twisted to left	Chin, pointed

Beard, sandy hair, f. chest  
Complexion, fair  
Weight, 160 lbs.

Measured at Joliet, March 19th. 1888, by M. H. Luke.

Remeasured, When and Where, {

# Anthropometry







# Biometrics, examples

Written signature

Retinal scan

DNA

Vein pattern

Thermal pattern of the face

Keystroke dynamics

Finger prints

Face geometry


Hand geometry



Iris pattern

Voice

Ear shape


Body motion patterns





# Enrollment

## Creating a user template






# Identification


“Who am I?”

Comparisons are made  
with every template in  
the database

The result is an identity  
(name or user ID) or  
“NO MATCH”



# Identification



# Identity verification = Authentication


“Am I the person who I claim I am?”

The user claims to have a certain identity (e.g.  
by specifying a user name)

Comparisons are made only with one template.

The result is TRUE/FALSE

# Identity verification



# Agenda for lecture I within this part of the course

Background

Statistics in user authentication

Biometric systems

Tokens

Authentication✓

eID✓

ePassports✓

Biometrics in general✓

Statistics

Fumy, W. and Paeschke, M. Handbook of eID Security

A. Jain, A. Ross and K. Nandakumar, Chapters 1 in "Introduction to Biometrics"



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