Information Security
Identification and authentication

Advanced User Authentication I

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LiU expanding reality

Agenda for this part of the course

Background

Statistics in user authentication

Biometric systems

Tokens

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Background

Statistics in user authentication

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Authentication

eID

ePassports

Biometrics in general

Statistics

Fumy, W. and Paeschke, M. Handbook of eID Security

A. Jain, A. Ross and K. Nandakumar, Chapter 1 in "Introduction to Biometrics”

User authentication/identification

Can in an IT system be achieved via

- What I know – passwords, PIN
- What I have – ID-cards, smart-card, token
- What I am/do – biometrics

Identification

Authentication

Human ID identification/authentication: Used when, where and why?

Forensics: Does a suspect match the features of a criminal

Banking/Financial services: Money only to its owners

Computer & IT Security: Access only to those authorised

Healthcare: Correct patient history (and billing)

Immigration: Blocking unwanted residents in spe

Law and Order: Punishing the correct person

Gatekeeper/Door Access Control: Access only if authorised

Telecommunication: Billing, trust base and privacy

Time and Attendance Logging: For future audit

Welfare: Only to valid beneficiaries

Consumer Products: Against unauthorised use, liability etc.

Biometric examples

SAS – Scandinavian Airline Systems: Fingerprints used to tie the person who checked in luggage to the person who passes the passenger gate.

OMX Group:To enter to most secret part of the company you have to authenticate yourself in an iris scan.

A school in Uddevalla, Sweden: To enter the dining area you needed to identify yourself with your fingerprint.

Disney World, SeaWorld and other amusement parks and entertainment centers: Fingerprints to tie tickets to their users

India: Welfare services tied to fingerprints

Authentication requirements

Can be presented only by the correct person

- Only the correct person knows the value
- Only the correct person can physically present the value

Has enough diversity to be unique enough

- Truly unique, can be used for identification
- Overlap very unlikely, can be used for authentication

eID: Electronic identity

Then: Manual ID control, e.g. in a bank or post office

Now: Transactions & communication online

Future: Internet of Things (IoT)

IoT ... Internet of Toilets?



A System for Identifying Toilet User by Characteristics of Paper Roll Rotation

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ABSTRACT

Along with the progress of miniaturization and energy saving technologies of sensors, biological information in our daily life can be monitored by installing the sensors to a lavatory bowl. Lavatory is usually shared among several people, therefore biological information need to be identified. Using camera, microphone, or scales is not appropriate considering privacy in a lavatory. In this paper, we focus on the difference in the way of pulling a toilet paper roll and propose a [illegible] identifies individuals based on features of rotation with a gyroscope. The evaluation [illegible] for a

to privacy concerns. Buttons or a touch panel to input user ID can be installed in a lavatory. However, it is not appropriate to force the users to input ID which is originally unnecessary action to the users every time they use a lavatory. Therefore, user identification through sensing actions we ordinary do, such as opening a toilet door, sitting on a toilet seat, pulling a toilet paper roll and flushing the toilet, is desirable. Personal traits are more likely to appear in pulling a toilet paper roll because most of us have never watched someone pulling a toilet paper roll or never learned how to pull it.

In this paper, we propose a system that recognizes indi- [illegible] based on how to pull a toilet paper roll. Our system [illegible] by attaching a

eID: Challenges

- New possibilities for criminal activity
  - Public administration, businesses and citizens act within digital networks
- Phishing
- Social engineering
- ID theft, Identity fraud
- Cyber attacks on personal data
- Spoofed websites
- Compromised log-in accounts

eID-threats and risks: Do I have to care?

- 2010: ID fraud survey
  - 5% US population victims of ID theft
  - 13% of ID fraud crimes by someone the victim knew
  - Financial losses
  - Re-establishing attacked ID: On average 21 hours
- Verification & authentication process less transparent than offline

eID: Necessary qualities

- Trust
- Data control
- Usability
- Interoperability
  - Mutual trust for administrations
  - Provide various security levels for eID services
  - Context sensitive approach
  - Provide private sector participation

eID: Necessary qualities

- Role of personal devices
  - 2011
    - 6,8 billion inhabitants
    - **4,6 billion mobile phones**
    - 1,7 billion Internet users
    - 1.6 billion TV:s
    - 3,9 billion radios
- Privacy protection
  - Pseudonymity & anonymity
- Documentless proof of ID?

eID: Challenges

- Need to prove ID on the Internet
- Verify identity of virtual counterpart
  - In eCommerce
  - In eGovernment
- Solution:
  - eID
  - eID management
  - Provide critical infrastructures for electronic businesses and governement & administration

eID: Security measures

Security of the eID document

Cryptography

Security protocols

Biometric techniques

Security of eID chips

"**FIDELITY**: **F**ast and trustworthy **I**dentity **D**elivery and check with **e**Passports **l**everag**i**ng **T**raveler privac**y**"

SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME

The ePassport

High efforts to make **travel documents more secure**, especially since September, 11

Launch of the **ePassport**

- specified by **ICAO**
- most difficult to forge travel document ever
- **embedded chip**
- **biometry** for ID checks



chip features & data

VIS UV IR



Success in ePassport deployment



345 million ePassports issued by 93 states
(ICAO estimates in July 2011)

But …

After several years of use, some weaknesses became apparent in

ePassport **issuing** process, security of **breeder documents**

Speed of ID checks at borders

Connections with **remote data bases** (SIS, VIS, Eurodac, PNR, ...)

Certificates management

Personal data protection

Means to check quality of **biometrics** data

Revocation



Frontex study

Reliability of the e-passport issuance

Information exchange

Training (and possibly tool provisioning)

Compile good practices

Common guidelines

Inter-country review

Lookalike fraud with e-passports is a substantial risk for EU/Schengen border control.

Improve the quality of the digital facial image

Usage of fingerprints in border control

Frontex study

The usage of e-passport functionality is limited and not uniform.

Training of border guards

Deployment of e-passport inspection

Harmonisation of the inspection procedure

Collect real-life performance data from Automated Border Control system pilots

Experienced operational difficulties in deploying e-passport inspection infrastructures.

Public key infrastructures

Document signing certificates in the e-passports

“Defect lists” in inspection systems

Frontex study

Cloning of e-passport chips is a serious concern.

Authenticating the chip in all EU e-passports

Security of national identity cards is not standardised, weak link in border control. (C6)

Phasing out the usage of the SHA-1 secure hash function as part of signing e-passport information.

Frontex study

The technical security measures: Increasingly hard to circumvent & standardised to a high degree

Focus of fraudsters is shifting towards the inspection and issuance procedures.

Country Signing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Used to verify the integrity of the data in the passports chip (has the data not been changed) and their authenticity (does the data originate from an official issuing authority)



Country Verifying Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Authenticates the inspection terminals of automated border control



Biometrics, definition

"The automated use of physiological or behavioural characteristics to determine or verify identity”

Bio from Greek life

Metric from Greek measurement

In this case we measure

- Physical properties of the user’s body
- Behaviour properties of the user

Biometrics

One of the remarkable abilities of humans and most animals is to identify other individuals

Humans do it primarily through face and voice.

Body proportions, movements etc. are also important



Using the anthropometry for biometrics is not a new idea...

Alphonse Bertillon 1853-1914

Identification through a system that involved around eleven measurements of the human anatomy

Paris, 1882

“Portrait parlé"

About an identification process that enables finding the name of a repeat offender based on his description only, and that can be used in the context of a classification of photographies in the police headquarters, in the national security office, at the ministry of justice, etc.

Alphonse Bertillon, 1881.

- body measurements
- iris coloration
- photography
- individual particularities (including fingerprints)



Anthropometry

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Authentication✓

eID✓

ePassports✓

Biometrics in general✓

Statistics

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