Vulnerabilities in C/C++ programs – Part I
TDDC90 – Software Security

Ulf Kargén
Department of Computer and Information Science (IDA)
Division for Database and Information Techniques (ADIT)
Vulnerabilities in C-based languages

- Programs compile directly to machine code
- Explicit control of memory given to programmers
  - Optimized for speed – not reliability
  - Subtle mistakes can have devastating security implications!
  - Understanding of low-level details necessary to take full advantage of language, and to avoid introducing vulnerabilities
    - Easy to make mistakes when coming from e.g. Java!
Outline of lectures

First lecture

- Introduction and motivation
- Assembly language primer
- Vulnerabilities and exploits

Second lecture

- More vulnerabilities and exploits
- Writing secure code
- Mitigations
- “Modern” exploit techniques
Introduction and motivation
Why look at vulnerabilities in C/C++ code?

C and C++ are old languages with known security problems

⇒ Why not just implement everything in Java / C# / Python and be done with it?

- Some code need to run “close to the metal” (OS kernels, device drivers)
- Performance reasons:
  - Web browsers, games, etc.
  - Low-powered devices (little RAM, slow CPU): Phones, Tablets, TVs, etc.
- Ultra low-powered devices ("Internet of things")
- “Green computing”
Why look at vulnerabilities in C/C++ code?

TIOBE Index for October 2021

October Headline: Python programming language number 1!

For the first time in more than 20 years we have a new leader of the pack: the Python programming language. The long-standing hegemony of Java and C is over. Python, which started as a simple scripting language, as an alternative to Perl, has become mature. Its ease of learning, its huge amount of libraries, and its widespread use in all kinds of domains, has made it the most popular programming language of today. Congratulations Guido van Rossum! Proficiat! -- Paul Jansen CEO TIOBE Software

The TIOBE Programming Community index is an indicator of the popularity of programming languages. The index is updated once a month. The ratings are based on the number of skilled engineers world-wide, courses and third party vendors. Popular search engines such as Google, Bing, Yahoo!, Wikipedia, Amazon, YouTube and Baidu are used to calculate the ratings. It is important to note that the TIOBE index is not about the best programming language or the language in which most lines of code have been written.

The index can be used to check whether your programming skills are still up to date or to make a strategic decision about what programming language should be adopted when starting to build a new software system. The definition of the TIOBE index can be found here.

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<td>-0.00%</td>
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<td>JavaScript</td>
<td>2.19%</td>
<td>+0.05%</td>
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Why study attack techniques?

- “Know thy enemy”
  - How could you possibly protect from attacks if you don’t know what techniques attackers use?

- Important to be able to tell if a bug has security implications
  - Scheduling/prioritizing patches
  - Decide what to publish on e.g. public bug trackers
Assembly language primer

Linux memory layout and x86 basics
Memory layout of x86 Linux
(What you will use in the Pong lab)

- All processes see 4GB of private continuous virtual memory. (Mapped by OS to RAM)
- The stack is located at high memory addresses and grows downwards in memory
  - Used for storing local variables of function calls, function call parameters, return addresses, etc.
- Main executable (Text), and its Data and BSS segment, is located in low memory
- The heap is located above the Text, Data, and BSS segment. Grows upwards in memory.
  - Used for dynamically allocated memory (malloc, new)
- Note: x86 is a little-endian architecture: First byte of e.g. a 4-byte word is the least significant byte.
Registers on the x86

- Four general-purpose 4-byte registers (EAX - EDX)
- Partial registers
  - 2 least significant bytes of full register \( nX \)
  - Bytes 1 and 2 of \( nX \) called respectively \( nL \) and \( nH \) (Low and High)

Special registers
- ESP – points to topmost element of stack
- EBP – points to current frame (on the stack), which contains local variables of one function call. Local variables accessed relative to EBP.
- EIP – points to the currently executing instruction

### Additional registers
- ESI and EDI
- CS, SS, DS, ES, FS, GS
- EFLAGS
- ...
Assembly language mnemonics

**Intel style**
- *opcode* destination, source
- `mov [esp+4], eax`

**AT&T (gcc, gdb) style**
- *opcode* source, destination
- `movl %eax, 4(%esp)`

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Instruction</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><code>mov dst, src</code></td>
<td>Copy the data in <em>src</em> to <em>dst</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>add/sub dst, src</code></td>
<td>Add/subtract the data in <em>src</em> to the data in <em>dst</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>and/xor dst, src</code></td>
<td>Bitwise AND/XOR the data in <em>src</em> with the data in <em>dst</em> and store result in <em>dst</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>push target</code></td>
<td>Push <em>target</em> onto the stack, decrementing ESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>pop target</code></td>
<td>Pop <em>target</em> from the stack, incrementing ESP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>lea dst, src</code></td>
<td>Load the address of <em>src</em> into <em>dst</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>call address</code></td>
<td>Push address of the next instruction onto stack and set EIP to <em>address</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ret</code></td>
<td>Pop EIP from the stack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>leave</code></td>
<td>Exit a high-level function (copy EPB to ESP, pop EBP from stack)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>jcc address</code></td>
<td>Jump to <em>address</em> if condition code <em>cc</em> (e.g. e, ne, ge) is set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>jmp address</code></td>
<td>Jump to <em>address</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>int value</code></td>
<td>Call interrupt of <em>value</em> (0x80 will perform a Linux system call)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Semantics of some important x86 instructions

- **push** `<op>`
  Equivalent to:
  ```
  esp = esp - 4
  [esp] = <op>
  ```

- **pop** `<op>`
  Equivalent to:
  ```
  <op> = [esp]
  esp = esp + 4
  ```

- **call** `<function address>`
  Instruction for performing a function call. Pushes return address to stack and jumps to start of called function.
  Equivalent to:
  ```
  push <address of next instruction>
  eip = <function address>
  ```

- **ret**
  Used to return from function. Pops return address from stack and jumps back to the calling function.
  Equivalent to:
  ```
  pop eip
  ```
## Direct vs indirect branches

<table>
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<th>Direct branches</th>
<th>Indirect branches</th>
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<tr>
<td>Addresses are <strong>hardcoded</strong> offsets relative to current instruction pointer</td>
<td>Addresses are <strong>stored in a register or memory</strong>, i.e. decided at <strong>runtime</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Examples:</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| - **call** 0x123  
  Equivalent to:  
  - push <address of next instruction>  
  - eip = eip + 0x123 (291 decimal) | - **call** eax  
  Equivalent to:  
  - push <address of next instruction>  
  - eip = eax |
| - **jmp** 0x123  
  Equivalent to:  
  - eip = eip + 0x123 | - **jmp** eax  
  Equivalent to:  
  - eip = eax |
| - **jcc** 0x123  
  Conditional branches are always direct | - **ret**  
  Target address stored on stack |

Used to implement calls via function pointers
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)

1. Caller pushes arguments from right to left onto stack
2. Caller issues a ‘call’ instruction – pushes return address and jumps to function start.
3. Function prologue executes
   a. Pushes old value of EBP to stack, updates EBP to point to saved EBP on stack
   b. Subtracts ESP to allocate space for local variables
4. Function main logic executes
5. Function epilogue executes
   a. Puts return value (if any) into EAX register
   b. “Deallocates” local variables on stack by increasing ESP
   c. Pops saved EBP into EBP
   d. Issues a ‘ret’ instruction – pops return address of stack and jumps to that address
6. Caller removes arguments from stack
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)

Example

```c
void foo(char* input) {
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
```
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)

Example

```
void foo(char* input)
{
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
```

Example caller's stack frame:

- ESP
- EBP
- Caller's stack frame
- input (argument to foo)
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)

Example

```c
void foo(char* input) {
    unsigned int len;
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Function calls on x86 (stdcall)
Example

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void foo(char* input)
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    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
```

Caller's stack frame
- Input (argument to foo)
  - Return address
  - Saved EBP

ESP, EBP
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)

Example

```c

void foo(char* input) {
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
```

```

Caller's stack frame

- input (argument to foo)
- Return address
- Saved EBP
- len
- buffer

ESP

EBP
```

foo(user_data);

```
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)

Example

```c
void foo(char* input)
{
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
```

Caller's stack frame

- input (argument to foo)
- Return address
- Saved EBP
- len

buffer

ESP

EBP
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)
Example

```c
void foo(char* input) {
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
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Example Caller's stack frame:
- input (argument to foo)
- Return address
- Saved EBP
- ESP, EBP
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)

Example

```c
void foo(char* input)
{
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
```

```
 caller's stack frame

 input (argument to foo)

 return address

 EB
```
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)
Example

```c
void foo(char* input)
{
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
```

Example Caller's stack frame

- EBP
- ESP

- input (argument to foo)
Function calls on x86 (stdcall)

Example

```c
void foo(char* input)
{
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];

    len = strlen(input);
    strcpy(buffer, input);

    printf("%s: %d\n", buffer, len);
}
```
Vulnerabilities and exploits
Vulnerabilities and exploits

- **Vulnerabilities**
  - Flaws that makes it possible for a program to fail to meet its security requirements

- **What is an exploit?**
  - A verb: Exploiting a vulnerability means to take advantage of a vulnerability to compromise security.
  - A noun: An exploit is a procedure or piece of code that performs the above.

- **The purpose of an exploit**
  - Arbitrary code execution – Completely take over program execution to do anything the attacker wishes.
  - Information disclosure – Leak sensitive information, e.g. Heartbleed
  - Denial of Service – Disrupt functionality of a service, e.g. crash a web server
  - Privilege escalation – Gain higher privileges than what is allowed according to system policy. May be combined with arbitrary code execution exploits to completely compromise system.
    - Example: Program running as SUID root in Unix, or with Administrator/SYSTEM privileges in Windows.
Vulnerabilities and exploits

- Local and remote exploits
  - Local exploit – Physical access to system, or valid remote login credentials, required for exploit.
  - Remote exploit – “Anyone” on e.g. the Internet can perform exploit. Example: Web server exploitable by external requests.

- Severity of a vulnerability depends on what kind of exploits it enables
  - Remote exploit leading to arbitrary code execution
  - Local DoS exploit
  - Local code execution exploit without privilege escalation
Vulnerabilities and exploits

- Local and remote exploits
  - Local exploit – Physical access to system, or valid remote login credentials, required for exploit.
  - Remote exploit – “Anyone” on e.g. the Internet can perform exploit. Example: Web server exploitable by external requests.

- Severity of a vulnerability depends on what kind of exploits it enables
  - Remote exploit leading to arbitrary code execution – Really, really bad!
  - Local DoS exploit – Not as bad?
  - Local code execution exploit without privilege escalation – Meaningless!
The “Hello World” exploit
Simple buffer overflow on the stack

```c
void foo(char* input)
{
    unsigned int len;
    char buffer[16];
    ...
    strcpy(buffer, input);
    ...
}
```

Let’s return to our function ‘foo’ from before

- What happens if ‘input’ is longer than 15 bytes?
- Buffer overflows, overwriting return address if string is long enough.
  - Program later crashes when trying to return to address 0x41414141 (“AAAA”)
  - Results in DoS. How to achieve arbitrary code execution?
The “Hello World” exploit
Arbitrary code execution

Idea: Include executable machine code in input string, and set the overwritten return pointer to point to that code.

- Such code is often referred to as “shellcode” – traditionally often used to open a command shell with elevated privileges.

- Payload consists of shellcode + padding (some A:s) + new “return” address

  - Note 1: Due to x86 being little-endian, each byte of the address (here BFFFC03 in hex) need to be given in reverse order when crafting the string (i.e. “\x03\xCD\xFF\xBF”)
  - Note 2: Payload must usually not contain any bytes with the value zero. Recall that zero (NUL) terminates the string.
  - Note 3: This payload may not work for ‘foo’ since buffer is only 16 bytes (not enough space for code). Also possible to e.g. put shellcode before return address on stack, in the caller’s stack frame.

- Problem: The above approach requires that we can precisely predict absolute address of shellcode on stack.

  - Typically not possible in practice!
The “Hello World” exploit
Making the exploit reliable: Solution 1 – The NOP sled

To avoid having to know the exact shellcode address, we can use a *NOP sled*

- Precede the shellcode with a sequence of NOP instructions.
  - A NOP instruction (hex `\x90`) does nothing, except of advancing the instruction counter one byte.
- Point the return address somewhere in the middle of the NOP sled
- Gives some “wiggle room” – As long as the return address points somewhere into the NOP sled, execution will follow the NOPs into the shellcode.
- Drawbacks:
  - Requires larger buffers
  - Still need to know approximate address of NOP sled
The “Hello World” exploit
Making the exploit reliable: Solution 2 – Register trampolines

A more robust solution than the NOP sled is to use register trampolines (a.k.a. register springs)

- Find a register \textit{REG} that right before the function returns points to data that you control.
  - Given that function behavior is deterministic, \textit{REG} will always point to the same location relative to the return address on stack.
- Make sure your shellcode starts at just the location pointed to by \textit{REG}
- Find an instruction in an executable image (main executable or shared library) that performs an indirect jump to address in \textit{REG}
- Overwrite return address with the address to the jump instruction.
- When function “returns”, it will jump to the instruction, which in turn will jump to the shellcode.
- Obviously not always possible to find suitable \textit{REG} and jump instruction.
Stack-buffer overflow variations

The function may alter parts of the overwritten stack area prior to returning – Special “tricks” often needed in practice

- Insert code that jumps past altered parts of stack to shellcode
- Put shellcode in environment variables
- Put shellcode in other buffers (e.g. on heap)
- ...

If return address cannot be overwritten, other targets are also possible

- Overwrite saved EBP – alters stack frame of calling function
- Overwrite function pointers on stack
- Overwrite other sensitive non-control data (i.e. data that is not a pointer to code)
Data-only attacks
Example

```c
void bar(char* user, bool isAdmin)
{
    bool full_priv = isAdmin;
    char buffer[16];

    strcpy(buffer, user);

    if(full_priv)
        // Do privileged stuff
    else
        printf("User %s is not admin \n", user);
}
```

Overwrite `full_priv` (to any non-zero value) with buffer overflow

---

**Caller's stack frame**

- User (argument to bar)
- Admin (argument to bar)
- Return address
- Saved EBP
- \01
- Full_priv
- Buffer
- A A A A A
- A A A A A
- A A A A A
- A A A A A

---

**ESP**

**EBP**
Special case: Off-by-one errors

Special case of stack-based overflows where only a single byte can be written past buffer bounds – Often more subtle than “regular” buffer overflows.

Example:
```c
char buffer[100];
if(strlen(input) > 100) {
    printf(“String too long!”);
    exit(1);
}
strcpy(buffer, input);

Should be:
```c
char buffer[100];
if(strlen(input) >= 100) {
    printf(“String too long!”);
    exit(1);
}
strcpy(buffer, input);
```

Is this safe?
- No! ‘strlen’ does not include the space needed for the NULL-terminator.
- Sending a 100-character string results in a NULL-byte being written past end of buffer.
- Could e.g. overwrite least significant byte of saved EBP to alter context of calling function. Can lead to arbitrary code execution!
Examples of stack-based buffer overflows

Real-life overflow in FTP server

```c
char mapped_path[MAXPATHLEN];
if(!(mapped_path[0] == '/' && mapped_path[1] == '\0'))
    strcat(mapped_path, "/");
strcat(mapped_path, dir);
```

Real-life overflow in web server (the pointer ‘ptr’ points to user-controllable data)

```c
int resolve_request_filename(char *ptr)
{
    char filename[255];
    ...
    if(!strncmp(ptr, thehost->CGIDIR, strlen(thehost->CGIDIR))) {
        strcpy(filename, thehost->CGIDIR);
        ptr += strlen(thehost->CGIDIR);
        strcat(filename, ptr);
    } else {
        strcpy(filename, thehost->DOCUMENTROOT);
        strcat(filename, ptr);
        ...
    }
```
Examples of stack-based buffer overflows

Off-by-one overflow in the wu-ftp server

```c
/*
 * Join the two strings together, ensuring that the right thing
 * happens if last component is empty, or the dirname is root.
 */

if (resolved[0] == '/' && resolved[1] == '\0')
    rootd = 1;
else
    rootd = 0;

if (*wbuf) {
    if (strlen(resolved) + strlen(wbuf) + rootd + 1 > MAXPATHLEN) {
        errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
        goto err1;
    }
    if (rootd == 0)
        (void) strcat(resolved, "/");
    (void) strcat(resolved, wbuf);
}
Avoiding buffer overflows
Some best practices

▪ Perform input validation
  ▪ Never trust user-supplied data!
  ▪ Accept only “known good” instead of using a blacklist
  ▪ Always perform correct bounds-checking before copying data to buffers

▪ Use safe(r) APIs for string operations
  ▪ E.g. `strncpy(dst, src, len)` instead of `strcpy(dst, src)`
  ▪ Beware: `strncpy` (and `strncat`) don’t NULL terminate strings if the length of ‘src’ is larger than or equal to the maximum allowed (i.e. `>= len`)
  ▪ The following code leads to information leakage if `strlen(str) >= 100` (Stack content beyond ‘buffer’ is printed, until a zero-byte is encountered) – Can also lead to code execution under some conditions.

```c
char buffer[100];
strncpy(buffer, str, sizeof(buffer));
...
printf("%s", buffer);
```
Avoiding buffer overflows
Some best practices

▪ Make sure to terminate strings when using the strn-functions.

```c
char buffer[100];
strncpy(buffer, str, sizeof(buffer));
buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = 0;
...
printf("%s", buffer);
```

▪ Use `str1cpy`, `str1cat` where available. These guarantee correct string termination.
  ▪ Note: These are not part of the standard C library. Not available on many systems (including the one you use for Pong).
Heap-based buffer overflows

- Often similar causes as stack-based buffer overflows

- Also often exploitable, but different methods compared to overflows on the stack (no return pointer to overwrite)
  - Overwrite function pointers or C++ VTable entries in other heap-allocated objects
  - Overwrite memory allocator metadata
Heap-based buffer overflows

Chunks of memory allocated on the heap are often adjacent to each other – Overflowing from one chunk into another possible:

- Possible to gain control by overflowing a heap-allocated buffer and overwriting function pointers in adjacent object on heap.
- Use e.g. one of previously discussed methods to “find” shellcode in memory:
  - (Semi)predicable location on stack or heap + NOP sled
  - Register trampolines
  - Shell code in environment variable, etc.
Function pointer overwrites
Example (C++)

```c++
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;

    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```
Function pointer overwrites
Example (C++)

```cpp
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;

    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);

    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Allocate new MyStruct object
Function pointer overwrites
Example (C++)

```cpp
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;

    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);

    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Set `fun_ptr` to point to `fun`
Function pointer overwrites
Example (C++)

```c++
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;

    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Allocate 16-byte buffer
Function pointer overwrites
Example (C++)

```c
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;

    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Buffer overflow!
Function pointer overwrites
Example (C++)

```c++
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;
    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

fun_ptr now points to nopsled/shellcode
Buffer overflow!
Function pointer overwrites
Example (C++)

```cpp
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;

    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

When trying to call `fun` (through `fun_ptr`), we instead jump to the shellcode.
Function pointer overwrites
Overwriting C++ VTable pointers

- Objects of classes with virtual functions have an implicit VTable-pointer data member
- The VTable pointer points to a table of function pointers for the specific class.
- Calls to virtual functions are made by looking up corresponding function pointer in VTable during runtime
  - Specific class type of object doesn’t need be statically known during compilation
- Possible to overwrite VTable pointer to point to a fake VTable using a buffer overflow
  - Not as easy as it may seem!
  - Need to overwrite with a pointer to a pointer to desired address
  - May still be possible with various “tricks”

```cpp
class MyClass {
  int var_a;
  int var_b;
  virtual void foo();
  virtual void bar();
};
```
Heap-based buffer overflows
Overwriting memory allocator metadata

- The memory allocator organizes memory into chunks of various sizes. Calling 'malloc' (C) or ‘new’ (C++) returns one such chunk.
- Allocator maintains a list of free chunks
- Many implementations store a block of metadata at beginning of chunks (just before the address returned by malloc/new)
  - Contains a back and forward pointer used to implement a linked list of free chunks.
  - When a chunk is unlinked from the free-list, allocator must perform:
    ```
    chunk->back->forward = chunk->forward
    chunk->forward->back = chunk->back
    ```
  - By overwriting back and forward pointers with carefully chosen values, an attacker can trick the memory allocator into writing an arbitrary value to an arbitrary address in memory.
    - E.g. various function pointers for dynamic loading, global destructors, etc.
- Modern allocators hardened with various integrity checks to avoid these attacks, but may still be possible to exploit under certain circumstances.
- Also, programs may use custom memory allocators with less protection
Other heap-related vulnerabilities

Use-after-free
- Program use stale pointer to heap-allocated memory that has already been freed.
- May lead to information disclosure…
  - Attacker can trick program into printing data in freed memory, after it has been re-allocated to store sensitive data
- …or arbitrary code execution
  - Attacker can have program re-allocate freed memory to store attacker-supplied data.
  - If program later use a function pointer or C++ VTable entry in freed object, execution can be redirected by attacker.

Double-free
- Program calls ‘free’ or ‘delete’ on pointer to already freed memory
- Can corrupt memory manager metadata to allow arbitrary code execution

Attacks often requires attacker to set up heap to look in a specific way for exploit to succeed
- “Heap feng shui”
Use-after-free Example (C++)

```c++
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;
    ...

    delete s;
    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    ...

    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Still heap, not stack
Use-after-free
Example (C++)

```c++
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;
    ...
    delete s;
    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    ...
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```
Use-after-free
Example (C++)

```cpp
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;
   ...
    delete s;
    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    ...
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```
Use-after-free
Example (C++)

```c++
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;
    ...,
    delete s;
    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    ...
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Allocate buffer. Previously freed space is now **re-used**
Use-after-free
Example (C++)

```cpp
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;
    ...
    delete s;
    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    ...
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Heap metadata

```
A  A  var_a A  NULL
xB0  xD xFF  xBF
A  A  A  A  A
A  A  A  A  A
```

**Attacker-controlled** data is copied into buffer
Use-after-free Example (C++)

```c++
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;
    ...

delete s;
    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    ...
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Heap metadata:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A var_A NUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xB0</td>
<td>xCD xFF xBF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A A A A A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A A A A A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Address to shellcode...

Attacker-controlled data is copied into buffer
Use-after-free
Example (C++)

```c
struct MyStruct {
    int var_a;
    void (*fun_ptr)(int);
};

void fun(int i);

void baz(char* str) {
    MyStruct* s = new MyStruct;
    s->fun_ptr = &fun;
    ...
    delete s;
    char* buffer = new char[16];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
    ...
    s->fun_ptr(5);
}
```

Heap metadata

```
A A var_A NUL
xB0 xCD xFF xBF
A A A A A
A A A A A
```

Program erroneously uses *stale* pointer to `s` to call `fun_ptr`.

Execution instead goes to shellcode!
Avoiding use-after-free and double-free bugs

- Set pointers to NULL directly after calling free/delete on them to avoid trivial errors.
- In practice, bugs are often caused by pointer aliasing – several pointers pointing to the same memory
  - One component calls free/delete on a pointer, while a different component keeps using another copy of the pointer
  - Avoid passing around pointers to heap-allocated data between different modules.
- Using the C++ “Resource Allocation Is Initialization” (RAII) pattern avoids confusion about which component is responsible for deallocating data.
- Use “smart pointers” with reference counting where applicable, (e.g. with respect to performance)