******************************************************************** ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER ON REASONING ABOUT ACTIONS AND CHANGE Issue 99025 Editor: Erik Sandewall 6.10.1999 Back issues available at http://www.etaij.org/rac/ ******************************************************************** ********* TODAY ********* Camilla Schwind today answers a question by Hector Geffner about her ETAI submitted article. (The concurrent discussion with Judea Pearl about the same article is calm for the moment). ********* ETAI PUBLICATIONS ********* --- DISCUSSION ABOUT RECEIVED ARTICLES --- The following debate contributions (questions, answers, or comments) have been received for articles that have been submitted to the ETAI and which are presently subject of discussion. To see the full context, for example, to see the question that a given answer refers to, or to see the article itself or its summary, please use the web-page version of this Newsletter. ======================================================== | AUTHOR: Camilla Schwind | TITLE: Causality in Action Theories | PAPER: http://www.ep.liu.se/ea/cis/1999/004/ | REVIEW: http://www.ida.liu.se/ext/etai/ra/rac/018/ ======================================================== Answer to Hector Geffner, who raised the following questions: 1. are the inference rules considered particularly relevant to causal reasoning? 2. are there significant inference rules that are not in the list? First, let me point out that my main purpose has been to compare existing approaches and not to define postulates. I prefer the term "comparison criteria". This is what I formulated and NOT postulates. ad 1. The criteria have been formulated with respect to the comparison task of several action theories which integrated causality; in this respect they are relevant as I think. ad 2. It happened to me to use other criteria, which are not in the list and which are more related to causality and update. Since NO one of the formalisms I reported could be compared along those criteria, I found it moderately interesting to include them. I think indeed that causality is a nonmonotonic inference relation (see my criterion 1). But there are properties of nonmonotonic inference which I reject for causlity (e.g. reflexivity). Camilla Schwind ******************************************************************** This Newsletter is issued whenever there is new news, and is sent by automatic E-mail and without charge to a list of subscribers. To obtain or change a subscription, please send mail to the editor, erisa@ida.liu.se. Contributions are welcomed to the same address. Instructions for contributors and other additional information is found at: http://www.etaij.org/rac/ ********************************************************************