

## **Brentano on intentionality**

*Psychology from Empirical Standpoint* (German orig.: *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 1874), edited by Oscar Kraus; English ed. edited by Linda L. McAlister, with a new introduction by Peter Simons, Translated by Antos C.Rancurello, D.B.Terrell and Linda L.McAlister, London 1973, 1975:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (§5)