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Logic-Based Modelling of Goal-Directed Behavior

Summary of the article

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We address the problem of characterizing goal-directed robotic behavior using a logic of actions and change. The logicist formalization is required to be such that the set of models is exactly the set of acceptable goal-directed behaviors in the application at hand, each model being a representation of a possible history of the world. It is not required from the logic that it should *represent* psychologically related concepts, such as goals or intentions, but merely that the resulting behavior obtained from the formalization should have the characteristics of being goal-directed.

Frame of reference and motivation

We view intelligent robotic behavior as something which has both a reactive level and a deliberative level. The deliberative level is in charge of such things as receiving instructions from the commander, pursuing goals, predicting the possible outcomes of intended actions, avoiding dangers, diagnosing faults, planning means of acquiring knowledge, and so on. The underlying, reactive level may be characterized by stimulus-response behaviors and by program-like composition of simpler behaviors into more complex ones.

Logic is clearly relevant for the design and analysis of the deliberative level of such a design. However, the logic being used then must be able to characterize its different functionalities, including its goal-directedness. It must also be able to characterize the underlying, reactive level, not in every detail, but with sufficient precision for the needs of the deliberative layer.

Procedural vs goal-directed actions

The present article focuses on the characterization of goal-directed behavior as one aspect of an intelligent robot. However, we do not introduce "goals" as a separate logical construct. Instead, our approach is to distinguish two kinds of actions: *procedural* actions which are defined using a subroutine, and *goal-directed* actions which are performed through a process involving tries, possibly failures, and corrective action and new tries until the goal has been reached. Procedural actions may therefore be used for representing reactive-level behaviors to the deliberative layer; goal-directed actions characterize processes within the deliberative layer itself.

Success vs failure of actions

For both kinds of actions (goal-directed and procedural ones), the logic expresses explicitly whether the action *succeeds* or *fails*. Each execution of a goal-directed action is also characterized by a number of *breakpoints* where some sub-action has been failed, and another sub-action is selected for one more attempt to arrive at the desired goal. The logic is used for characterizing the selection of sub-actions at breakpoints, and the success or failure of the goal-directed action in terms of the success or failure of the sub-actions.

The term "goal" is used in the sense used in AI planning, that is, as the concrete goal (goal state) that is to be achieved by a plan = a sequence of actions. We do not use the word in the sense of "general goal" (goal in life).

Formalism for actions and change

We use a logic of time and action, that is, a multi-sorted first-order logic where points in time is one of the sorts. The following predicates are used:

$\mathsf{H}(t,p)$: the "propositional fluent" p holds at time t.

$\mathsf{X}(t,f)$: the fluent f is occluded at time t

$\mathsf{G}(s,a)$: the action a is invoked ("go") at time s

$\mathsf{A}(s,a)$: the action a is applicable at time s

$\mathsf{D_s}([s,t],a)$: the action a is executed successfully over the time interval $[s,t]$: it starts at time s and terminates successfully at time t.

$\mathsf{D_f}([s,t],a)$: the action a is executed but fails over the time interval $[s,t]$: it starts at time s and terminates with failure at time t.

In fact, these predicates are viewed as abbreviations for underlying, more elementary constructs indicating the applicability and the failure of actions.

Actions are composed using the conventional operators such as sequential composition ($;$), conditionals, etc.

The article proposes a set of axioms that characterize possible structures using these and related predicates.

Formalism for goal-directed behavior

A few specialized relations are introduced for characterizing the goal-directed behavior. The key relation is:

$Option(s', g, s, a)$: while pursuing the goal set by invoking the goal-directed action g at time s', one is now at a timepoint s (a breakpoint), and one considers performing the action a. This action may be a composite one, which means that it has the character of a plan. Several follow-up actions may be considered at the same point in time.

The article proposes a set of axioms that characterize goal-directed behavior in terms of this predicate and the ones mentioned under the previous heading.

Entailment methods

A logic characterizing goal-directed use of actions must deal with multiple knowledge sources, including action laws characterizing the effects of actions, observations of the state of the world, plans for achieving specific goals, and so forth. Each of these aspects of the system may call for some kind of nonmonotonicity in order to be sufficiently selective. It is not trivial how to combine the different types of nonmonotonicity that are required. The present article proposes and uses a general approach for dealing with this problem.